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Sandusky Internship

The following is an annotated bibliography of sources primarily taken from Historic Sandusky which deal with the historical memory of the Battle of Lynchburg. Specifically, the topics examined are the importance of the battle, reasons for its outcome, use of the sick and elderly as soldiers, experiences of African slaves, the pursuit of Hunter to Liberty, the portrayal of General Hunter, and the story of General Early tricking Hunter into believing his force to be greater than it was by continuously running trains are given particular attention. Logistical information such as the arrival times, sizes, and state of both armies, as well as casualties are also discussed when particularly relevant to the source material, however such information can be found at least in part in nearly all of the listed material, and lack of its mention does not mean the information is not present.

Battle of Lynchburg Historical Memory Annotated Bibliography

Beach, William H. *The First New York (Lincoln) Cavalry*. New York: The Lincoln Cavalry Association, 1902.

This Union perspective from nearly a half century after the war in many ways gives a standard account of the Battle. Of these typical descriptions is Hunter being portrayed as a vandal, despite this piece coming from a Northern perspective. In addition, the retreat is described as resulting from Hunter lacking ammunition and the city too well defended, typical Northern reasoning for the outcome. This reasoning is contradicted by other, primarily Southern, sources. Finally, there is no mention of the train ruse, which is generally only mentioned after Blackford's account is first given.

Blackford, Charles M. *Campaign and Battle of Lynchburg*. Peter W. Houck, ed. Lynchburg: Warwick House Press, 1994.

Blackford provides an account of the battle, written a few decades after it occurred and presented orally at the turn of the twentieth century. It still remains the most widely cited source on the battle, despite the fact that he was not at the battle, and instead interviewed veterans to piece his speech together. This is the earliest direct mention of the train ruse, although some other sources may or may not be referring to it indirectly, and all other authors who follow cite him as their source for the story. The account has the expected pro Southern, anti Union tone.

“Battle of Lynchburg: Hunter Failed in Expedition to get stores.” *The News*. October 11, 1936.

This article was written fifty years after the Battle of Lynchburg. The author identifies it as a minor clash which was still important as it prolonged the war. The author laments the relative lack of sources on the topic, and identifies Blackford as the best authority on the topic, despite the fact that he was never there. Most of the given details are taken directly from or otherwise match Blackford’s account.

Christian, W. Asbury. *Lynchburg and Its People*. Lynchburg: J.P. Bell, 1900.

The chapter on the Battle of Lynchburg in this secondary history of the city and people of Lynchburg provides a predictably pro Southern view of the battle, complete with glowing praise of the Confederate army. Of interest are the casualty estimations on page 222, provided nearly forty years after the battle. Hunter’s losses are estimated to be one hundred killed, five hundred wounded and missing. The Confederate losses are estimated to be six killed and ninety five wounded.

“Defense of Lynchburg: Account of Gen. Early’s Campaign and Hunter’s Retreat.” *Daily Virginian*. March 16, 1888

This Lynchburg newspaper article provides a wealth of information showing how Virginians remembered the battle a couple decades after it occurred. Hunter’s army, estimated at twenty thousand men, is described as being larger and better supplied than the Confederate defenders who sought to stop the destruction of the town. Ultimately, Hunter failed after being delayed by Beckinridge and Early arriving just in time. The Union also suffered heavier casualties than the Confederacy and the retreat resulted in further humiliation. As is standard, Hunter is portrayed in a negative light.

Du Pont, H.A. *The Campaign of 1864 In The Valley Of Virginia And The Expedition To Lynchburg*. United States of America: Warwick House Press, 1925.

This Union account was written by an officer serving under Hunter, who admits to using other accounts to refresh his memory, likely including the prominent account given by Blackford. As such, the train ruse is indirectly alluded to, mentioning that some heard cheers as trains rolled in but that Hunter was not tricked, instead ordering a skirmish to judge Early’s strength, which he determines to be too great for his army. The retreat is then ordered due to the reinforcements, which he believed made the Confederate force stronger than his own, and his general lack of supplies.

“Editorial.” *New York Times*. July 3, 1864.

This New York editorial provides praise of Hunter, and describes the Battle of Lynchburg as a Northern success. According to the piece, Hunter's mission was one of destruction, and he achieved it. It was Lynchburg's superior defensive, and not Hunter's actions, which prevented its fall. Although Hunter lost some artillery, this is blamed on his officers. Such a positive portrayal of Hunter and the battle was not uncommon in the North shortly following the battle, although these portrayals quickly soured as more information came to light.

Foutz, Susan and George Morris. *Lynchburg in the Civil War: The City-The People- The Battle*. Lynchburg: H.E. Howard, Inc., 1984.

In this piece of local history, the battle is examined in an expected pro Southern tone. Hunter is portrayed in the expected negative light, and the authors spend time disputing his reasoning for delaying his advance, a fateful decision. The authors claim that if he really needed ammunition, he wouldn't have destroyed a supply of it on route to the city. In addition, the Confederate troops are described as being victorious despite being so undersupplied that they fought barefoot and being forced to recruit a militia from the hospital to protect the city until Early arrived.

Frederick Anspach to Robert Anspach, letter, June 23, 1864, Sandusky Archives.

This Southern letter touches on the experiences of slaves during the battle. According to Anspach, some slaves left with the Yankees. Others used the confusion of the battle to escape by themselves. In other cases, the Union troops plundered from the Southerners and gave what they stole to the African Americans. The state of the Confederate troops is also mentioned, and they are described as being tired and broken down, just as Union troops are described to be in the same condition.

"From Lynchburg." *The Sentinel Daily*. June 17, 1864.

This news report provides an estimate of Hunter's strength and an assessment of his advance. He is estimated as having eighteen thousand troops. Like other reports and analysis' he is described as moving too slow to achieve his objective of capturing Lynchburg.

"Gen. Hunter's Options." *The Virginian*. June 24, 1864

This Lynchburg article describes atrocities visited upon citizens due to the actions of Hunter, in one of the stricter attacks on his character. The battle's effect on African Americans is also touched upon. Hunter's troops are credited with freeing a number of slaves. These actions could be the result of Hunter's disgust at the treatment of the slaves by their southern masters.

"Hunter: Additional Details of the Expedition to Lynchburg," *The New York Herald*, July 3, 1864.

In this Union paper, a correspondent for the Cincinnati Gazette reports on the Battle of Lynchburg. Of particular interest is the fact that the Northern author places the blame for loss of the battle squarely on Hunter, in contrast to other Northern reports which sought to down play the events. However, there is still a clear pro Northern slant placed on the battle, as it is reported that the rebels refused to meet the Union in battle during the retreat, as they were sure they would lose. The author also describes the other reasons for the loss as being a shortage of rations, and the rebel troops far surpassing the Union in both number and freshness. While we know that the Union army in fact had the advantage of size, this report is consistent with other Northern accounts from the war which almost invariably describe the Northern army to be outnumbered. There is also an account of the rebels use of the trains, as it is reported that they were used to bring reinforcements, an account also consistent with others, which when taken together suggest there was no ruse, but rather actual reinforcements.

“Hunter’s Atrocities in the Valley.” *The Virginian*. June 23, 1864.

This Lynchburg article recalls past actions of Hunter that the author believes reflect on what actions he would have taken had he been victorious. As mentioned in numerous accounts, Hunter and his troops were responsible for the destruction of property. A more disturbing story is also provided, recounting Hunter having a woman locked in a burning house. Accounts like these were responsible for Hunter’s poor reputation.

“Hunter’s Command at Charlestown, W. VA—His Great Raid_ What he Accomplished_ Another Movement in Prospect.” *New York Tribune*. July 4, 1864.

This New York article claims that Hunter’s raid was a success when judged financially. The expenditure for the Union is estimated to have been two thousand dollars, while it cost the rebels five thousand. At the time, many Northerners made excuses to justify the loss while others sincerely believed it to be a victory. It is also mentioned that Hunter was low on rations, a point often brought up when giving reasons for his failure.

“Hunter’s Expedition.” *Cincinnati Gazette*. June 25, 1864.

This article from the Cincinnati Gazette greatly exaggerates the effectiveness of Hunter’s raid on Lynchburg, describing it as the greatest raid on record. Regardless, while it congratulates Hunter on destroying railroads and roads along his route, the article hints at the extent of his defeat. Claiming that Hunter retreated after concluding the rebels to be stronger, the Confederates are described as capturing horses and cannons during the retreat. In addition, Hunter’s poor supplies are shown as the article brags about his troops living off of the country.

“Hunter, the Hyena.” *Richmond Whig*. June 27, 1864.

This article provides a negative portrayal of Hunter, who is described as unredeemable. In particular, he is accused of murder and the destruction of property. Such accusations were common in the South, but less so in the North.

“Hunter’s Victory.” *The Virginian*. June 24, 1864.

This response to a New York report touches on the significance and importance of the battle as Lynchburg was a key to the Confederacy. It also discusses Hunter’s success prior to the battle, which was apparently so great that the New York article is entitled Hunter’s victory. However, these claims of Hunter’s victorious campaign proved premature, and were typical of Northern newspaper exaggerating successes and downplaying defeats.

James, James R. *To See The Elephant: The Civil War Letters of John A. McKee (1861- 1865)*. United States: Leather’s Pro, 1998.

These letters represent a Union view of what the author considers a crucial battle, as well as an example of Hunter’s own men portraying him negatively and blaming him for the loss. Some statistical information is also provided, such as casualties and division sizes. Once again, Hunter is described as being short on supplies.

John W. Joyce to Frances A Joyce, letter, June 18, 1864, Sandusky Archives.

This letter from a Confederate soldier to his wife reflects common Southern perceptions and themes of the battle. Firstly, the Confederate forces arrived just in time to save the city. Secondly, the Northern armies, and Hunter specifically, are portrayed as horrible vandals. It also gives a description of Southern heroism, as it is reported that crippled men were used to defend the city.

Jones Memorial Library. “Letters From the Battle of Lynchburg, Summer 1864.” Sandusky Archive.

This reflective piece shows the remembrance of the battle by Lynchburg residents. According to the library reflective piece, the Confederates were outnumbered. Also included are a few letters showing life during the battle.

JWI to Nannie, letter, June 24, 1864, Sandusky Archives.

In this letter from a Confederate soldier, yet another account is given of Yankee vandalism. JWI reports that the Northern army did a great deal of damage to the farms that lined the roads on which they travelled. Such actions were responsible for Hunter’s poor reputation in the South and even among some of his own men.

“Latest from Staunten to Dix.” *The Virginian*. June 22, 1864.

This newspaper article touches on the reasons behind Hunter’s retreat. It is considered to be the result of Hunter believing himself to be outnumbered, coupled with the arrival of reinforcements and the belief that the citizens were armed. This belief may have resulted from the use of the sick and injured to defend the city.

“Letter from the 15th N.Y. Cavalry.” *The Daily Journal*. New York. July 14, 1864.

This letter from a member of the fifteenth New York Cavalry reflects on the state of Hunter’s troops. Hunter is described as being so low on rations that they had to forage for food. This is consistent with other reports describing Hunter’s army as poorly supplied.

Lettie Burwell to Mrs. Lee, letter, July 16, 1864, Sandusky Archives.

In this heavily biased letter, an enraged Lettie Burwell sarcastically mocks Hunter and his failure, which she like most others considers to be the result of his slow advance. Once again, Hunter is portrayed as an incompetent vandal. According to Burwell, Hunter and his estimated army of fifteen to twenty thousand mistakenly believed that they had succeeded in their goal of distracting Lee’s army. In addition, an account of the experiences of slaves during the battle that is contradictory to other accounts is given. Burwell claims that the slaves refused to leave with the Union army, or use the battle as a distraction to escape. In addition, she claims that the Yankees robbed African Americans in the area.

Lt. Col. W. H Stevens Order. Sandusky Archive.

This Confederate order was issued commanding Lynchburg slaves to help prepare the city’s defenses before the battle. This appears to be the closest to the actual battle that Lynchburg slaves found themselves. However, some would use the battle to escape.

”Marker Dedicated At Celebration in 1932.” *The Times Register*. June 18, 1964.

This news article describes Hunter’s retreat nearly seventy years after the battle. The reason for the retreat is given as the arrival of Early’s reinforcements. The retreat is described as yet another failure by Hunter.

Markham, J.H., compiled by. “Personal Observations and Accounts of The Battle of Lynchburg.” Sandusky Archives.

This is a collection of accounts of the Battle of Lynchburg. The first is from Edward A. Craighill fifty years after the battle, and he reflects that Grant considered the capture of the city to be of great importance. Hunter's army is estimated at thirty five to forty two thousand, and Hunter himself is described as a vandal, arsonist, and bully. Other Confederate accounts describe the rebels arriving just in time and as being outnumbered. One Union soldier concurs with Southern reports of Yankee soldiers pillaging, and believes that the capture of the poorly supplied Lynchburg will end the war. It is also noted that all of the sick and wounded from the hospital had been organized to protect the city. Ultimately it is concluded that Hunter lost because he wasted too much time bullying women and children, according to General Early. Arrival times and casualties are also discussed.

Marks, John G. "Jubal Early's Trains: The Battle of Lynchburg in Historical Memory." Thesis, Lynchburg College, 2009.

This senior thesis by a past Lynchburg College student examines the historical memory of the train ruse. The argument is that not only is the train ruse a myth, but much of the battle been greatly exaggerated by Southerners seeking to make it more glamorous and important than it was. To support this thesis he argues that Blackford was the first and only original source to mention the train ruse and shows Southern accounts to be exaggerating the size of Hunter's army. He also discusses the tendency of later sources to focus more and more on Southern heroism and Northern incompetence.

"Military Vandalism." *Washington Daily Intelligencer*. August 25, 1864.

This editorial provides a look at Hunter's portrayal in the North. According to the article, Hunter caused widespread ruin wherever he went. In addition, he is blamed for causing harm to innocent people and destroying their property. A final shot is taken against him when the writer claims he acts this way because he is unable to win any battles. While some in the North were inclined to defend Hunter, this position was not unanimous.

"News From Rebel Sources," *New York Daily Tribune*, July 1, 1864.

This Confederate report obtained by the North is full of battle numbers from Lynchburg, including listing the Union arrival time as Friday morning. Union losses are also reported as eight hundred killed, wounded, or missing, with approximately one hundred of these being killed and one hundred and fifty wounded, and the rest unaccounted for. There was no improvement during Hunters retreat to Liberty, during which time hundreds more of his men were captured along with wagons, ten pieces of artillery, and two hundred horses. Also during the retreat, as was typical for Hunter, the Union destroyed private property and bridges along their path which play into his typical portrayal as a vandal. The reason for the retreat is stated to be in part due to shortage of rations. As for Confederate losses, they are placed at six killed and ninety five wounded. In addition, the size of the Union army is placed at approximately fifty thousand, based off of bragging by Hunter and is greatly exaggerated.

Pond, George E. *The Shenandoah Valley in 1864*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1883.

This Union perspective of the battle and campaign provides a pro Hunter portrayal despite being written years after the end of the war. According to the author, the pillaging that occurred was done against orders, and to the contrary of reports of Hunter vandalizing the South, a story is given in which he saves the homes of southerners after they are mistakenly lit on fire while burning a bridge. The campaign is also claimed to be a success, insisting that the North killed more than they lost, seized supplies, and diverted troops. This was despite Hunter's retreat, which was explained as being the result of a lack of supplies and ammunition as well as being delayed to resupply ammunition and reunite with part of his army. Such a pro Northern stance of the battle is rare so long the war.

Strother, David Hunter. *A Virginian Yankee in the Civil War*. North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1998.

This Northern firsthand account reflects on Hunter's raid between pages 262 and 267. In it, he recalls the delay the Northern army encountered as a result of a bridge being out as being fatal and also recalls the Union belief that they were outnumbered at Lynchburg, a belief stemming in part from Confederate prisoners reporting their strength to be thirty thousand. In addition, the account provides another example of a Union officer reporting trains being used to carry reinforcements, accompanied by Confederate fanfare. Such reports would seem to lend credence to the train ruse story, however these accounts and Confederate stories of arriving just in time suggest that the supposed ruse was actually the continued arrival of Early's troops.

S.D. Newsome to Dr. J.B. Jones, letter, June 27, 1864, Sandusky Archives.

In this Confederate letter, the Battle of Lynchburg is described as a crushing defeat, despite the rebels arriving just in time, with the Union only two and a half miles from the city. Newsome describes the battle as the Confederates driving back the Yankees to considerable slaughter. The retreat to Liberty is described in similar terms, as a one sided thrashing.

Sturm, Jesse Tyler. *From a Whirlpool of Death... to Victory, Civil War Remembrances of Jesse Tyler Sturm, 14th West Virginia Infantry*. Mary E. Johnson, ed. Charleston: West Virginia, 2000.

Pages 42 through 45 of Jesse Tyler Sturm's Civil War remembrances offer ample details on the battle. According to Sturm, the Union's loss was in part due to Hunter's failure to use his full force or call up reinforcement, citing artillery, cavalry, and several brigades of infantry who were not engaged. Such a claim of the loss being Hunter's fault is consistent with most other assessments of the battle. Also touched on is the role that African Americans played in the battle, as he notes that "the rebels assembled all the negroes in the country and set them to

building breastworks.” The state of the Union troops is touched on as well as it is noted that they were out of rations. Both are consistent with other accounts.

“The Great Skeddaddle,” *The Times-Register*. June 18, 1864.

This article editorializes the battle as a sound beating for Hunter before going into a firsthand Northern account. The account shows Hunter’s army as out of supplies and ammunition as well as seemingly demoralized. The description of a overwhelming Southern victory is typical of public Southern recollections, just as the description of the state of Hunters troops is typical of memoirs and other firsthand accounts.

“The Latest From Hunter’s Army,” *Daily Republican*. June 29, 1864.

This account details Hunter’s retreat. After the battle, many stragglers were captured and taken prisoner by Confederate forces, a pattern that would continue for the remainder of the retreat. In addition, it is claimed that Hunter lost nearly all of his artillery and entire wagon train of eight hundred to one thousand wagons.

“The Raid in West Virginia,” *Cincinnati Daily Gazette*, July 1, 1864.

In this Union paper from shortly after the battle, the editor attacks a rebel paper which describes the Battle of Lynchburg as a crushing Union defeat, which he believes have been exaggerated. After he quotes the *Richmond Examiner*, which shows the extent of Hunter’s loss, he denies these claims. Instead, he insists that that the raid was a success due to some bridges being burned, and portrays the retreat as a homeward march from a successful raid. This source show the bias of contemporary sources, and how different sources portrayed the battle differently, generally based on region. While this is a contemporary account, the later the account the more pro Southern they generally become due to the view of the past becoming clearer and a Southern majority writing on the topic.

Thomas J. Goree to Sarah Williams Kittrell Goree, letter, July 14, 1864, Sandusky Archive.

This incomplete letter provides some information on Hunter’s retreat to Liberty. During the retreat, the Confederate army constantly harassed the rear guard of the Union army, resulting in Early capturing prisoners, horses, and equipment. The account also notes that the Battle of Lynchburg resulted in heavy losses for the North and relatively few casualties for the Southern army.

U.S. Grant to Gen. Hunter, letter, June 6, 1864, “The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series 1- Volume XXXVII- In

Two Parts- Reports, Correspondence, etc.”, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891, p.598.

In this letter from General U.S. Grant to General Hunter, Grant stresses the strategic importance of capturing Lynchburg. Although there has been some question as to whether or not Hunter ever received the letter, it is still valuable as an indication of the Union view of Lynchburg and what they would encounter there. According to Grant the strategic importance of Lynchburg to the war effort was such that “it would be of great value to us to get possession of Lynchburg for a single day.” However, he also predicts the city to be strongly defended, and warns Hunter that as a result he may well meet defeat. This is yet another example of the North overestimating the strength of Lynchburg’s defenses, and such views may have influenced Hunter’s decision to retreat.

“War Bulletin,” *The Evening Post*, New York, June 23, 1864.

This Union report provides a defense of Hunter. The war bulletin reports that Hunter was repulsed at Lynchburg, but counters with a claim that the battle was only reconnaissance and Hunter withdrew after observing a superior force. Such a defensive article seems to have been common shortly after the battle, but halted once the facts became apparent and Hunter’s standing diminished.

Watson, William G, Memoirs, “A Union Soldier in the Shenandoah Valley”, 1864, VMI Archives Manuscript #037.

In these memoirs William G. Watson, a Union soldier, gives an account of the Battle of Lynchburg. The account provides an estimation for the arrival time of a portion of the Union troops, as Watson notes that they arrived on the battlefield a little past noon on June 17th, after a fifteen mile march. The Union perspective of the Confederate troops are also on display, as by the next day Watson and his compatriots had come to believe that one third of General Lee’s veterans had arrived from Richmond. Such a mistaken belief is consistent with other Union estimates of the Confederates having the superior fighting force, a factor that influenced Hunter’s decision to retreat.

Wilson, Edward S. “The Lynchburg Campaign,” *Sketches of War History, 1861-1865, Papers Prepared for the Ohio Commandery of the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United States*, W.H. Chamberlin, ed. vol. iv, Cincinnati: The Robert Clarke Company, 1896, pp.133-146.

In this account, written by a Union Lieutenant who was present at the Battle of Lynchburg, the battle is examined and determined to be of great importance while the outcome is concluded to be Hunter’s fault. Between pages 137 and 146, Hunter is portrayed in an overwhelmingly negative light, as he is shown to blame others for his failings, including the Union loss in the battle, a direct result of his deliberately slow advance. This would be an important loss, and

Wilson estimates a victory would have ended the war by interrupting Confederate supplies. In addition, he notes the use of the sick and other invalids in defending the city, while also describing the “music of the bands, the rattle of the drums, the shouts of the troops and the populace” as Early and his troops arrived throughout the night. Such a description suggests that Blackford’s train ruse story may be based on such an arrival, and may not have been a ruse after all.